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Articles 
BEYOND THE ROAR OF THE CROWD: VICTIM IMPACT 
TESTIMONY COLLIDES WITH DUE PROCESS 
by Marshall N. Perkins 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Victim's Rights 
In early Anglo-American law, the victim played 
a significant role in the administration of criminal 
justice. I As the antecedents to American common law 
developed, however, the state replaced the victim as 
the prosecuting party in a criminal action.2 The 
evolution of the American criminal justice system 
positioned lawyers, rather than victims, as the agents 
of the state responsible for prosecuting criminal 
activity.3 The diminution of the victim's role in the 
criminal justice system reflects the fundamental 
principle that criminal offenses are committed against 
the community as a whole.4 In conflict with this 
principle of community representation, there are 
contemporary concerns that the American criminal 
justice system ignores the impact on the victim and 
denies the victim participation in the process.s 
Originating as a campaign by women's groups to 
inform the public about the problems confronting rape 
complainants,6 this movement to reform the criminal 
justice system has gained momentum, seeking to 
accord greater weight to the interests of victims of 
ISee Patrick M. Fahey, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eyefor an 
Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REv. 205, 208 (1992). 
2See id. 
3See Keith D. Nicholson, Note, Would You Like More Salt with 
that Wound? Post-Sentence Victim Allocution in Texas, 26 ST. 
MARY'S L. J. 1103, 1109 (1995). 
Wee Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's 
Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187,225 (1995) 
("[T]he American system is based on the very notion that 
criminal offenses are committed against 'the people. '''). 
sSee Craig Edward Gilmore, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Rejection 
of Precedent, Recognition of Victim Impact Worth, 41 CATH. U. 
L. REv. 469, 478-79 (1992). 
6See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 1111. 
crime.7 
One vehicle developed for vindicating the 
interests of victims allows testimony during the 
sentencing proceeding by the victim as to the impact 
of the crime on the victim's life.8 The purpose of 
allowing the victim an active role in the sentencing 
decision is to provide the victim with a sense of 
dignity and respect, and also to ensure that the 
offender's punishment corresponds to the full extent 
of the harm caused.9 In effect, such testimony seeks 
to influence courts to redress the specific harm 
suffered by victims. 10 
Ostensibly, the victim rights' movement has 
sought to alter the criminal justice system to reflect the 
proper balance between the interests of victims and the 
rights of criminal defendants. I I This balance cannot 
ignore, however, the principle that the sentencing 
process must necessarily focus on the particular 
characteristics of the offender and the direct 
circumstances of the crime. 12 Victim impact 
7Kathryn E. Bartolo, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: The Future Role 
of Victim Statements of Opinion in Capital Sentencing 
Proceedings, 77 IOWAL. REv. 1217, 1219 (1992)(observing that 
the victim's movement "seeks to reform the process by giving 
greater weight to the interests of other parties affected by crime 
- namely victims") (footnote omitted). 
8See Fahey, supra note 1, at 211 (noting such testimony is one of 
"the most controversial means of vindicating victim's interests"). 
9See id. at211-12. 
I°See Bartolo, supra note 7, at 1219. 
IISee Fahey, supra note I, at 210; Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Many citizens have 
found one-sided and hence unjust the criminal trial in which a 
parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the pressures beyond 
normal human experience that drove the defendant to commit his 
crime, with no one to lay before the sentencing authority the full 
reality of human suffering the defendant has produced .... "). 
12See Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform 
or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 391, 398 (1989) ("The 
27.2 U. Bait. L. F. 31 
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testimony immediately before sentencing introduces 
elements of retaliation and personal vengeance into the 
proceedings. 13 The practical impact of such testimony 
must therefore be analyzed against the erosion of a 
criminal defendant's constitutional rights. 14 
B. Booth v. Maryland 
In need of money to satiate their heroin habit, 
between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. on May 18, 1983, John 
Marvin Booth and Willie Reid entered the Baltimore 
home of Irvin and Rose Bronstein. IS Aware that their 
robbery victims knew Booth, the conspirators 
separately bound and gagged both Mr. and Mrs. 
Bronstein. 16 Booth then stabbed Mr. Bronstein in the 
chest twelve times, while Reid administered a dozen 
equally fatal stab wounds to Mrs. Bronstein. 17 The 
Bronsteins' bodies were found in their living room by 
their son on May 20. 18 
Booth's first trial ended in a mistrial. I9 At his 
second trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City, Booth was convicted as a principal in 
the first degree of the premeditated and felony murder 
of Mr. Bronstein.20 At the bifurcated capital sen-
tencing proceeding, the trial judge admitted victim 
impact statements pursuant to a recently enacted 
statute.21 
The victim impact evidence included a statement 
by the Bronsteins' son that "his parents were not 
killed, but were butchered like animals," and that he 
sentencer is then implicitly encouraged to weigh the relative 
blameworthiness of the offender and the victim.") (footnote 
omitted). 
13See id. 
14See id. at 397. 
IS See Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 182, 507 A.2d 1098, 1103 
(1986) (hereinafter Booth I). 
16/d. at 185, 507 A.2dat 1104. 
17Id. 
18See id. at 181,507 A.2d at 1103. 
19See Booth v. State, 301 Md. 1,481 A.2d 505 (1984). 
20See Booth I, 306 Md. at 182,507 A.2d at 1103. 
21See id. at 222-223,507 A.2d at 1123-1124; see Md. Ann. Code, 
art. 41, § 124 (Supp. 1995). 
27.2 U. BaIt. L. F. 32 
did not "think anyone should be able to do something 
like that and get away with it."22 The evidence 
introduced also included a statement by the victims' 
daughter that "animals wouldn't do this. They didn't 
have to kill because there was no one to stop them 
from looting .... The murders show the viciousness 
of the killers' [sic] anger-" and the daughter further 
opined that she did not "feel that the people who did 
this could ever be rehabilitated."23 
Relying on its analysis in Lodowski v. State, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected Booth's 
argument that the introduction of such victim impact 
evidence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by injecting an arbitrary factor into the 
capital sentencing proceeding.24 In affirming Booth's 
death sentence, the Court of Appeals rejected the 
assertion that the victims' statements may have 
allowed the sentencing jury to impermissibly act upon 
"passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."25 
The United States Supreme Court then granted a 
writ of certiorari to resolve whether the Constitution 
prohibits a jury from considering a "victim impact 
statement" during the sentencing phase of a capital 
murder tria1.26 A narrow five justice majority reversed 
Booth's death sentence. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Powell recognized that "a jury's discretion to impose 
the death sentence must be 'suitably directed and 
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary 
and capricious action. "'27 Powell reasoned that this 
necessarily individualized determination must reflect 
22Booth 1,306 Md. at 236,507 A.2d at 1131 (Cole, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
23Id. at 238,507 A.2d at 1132 (Cole, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
24See id. at 222-23,507 A.2d at 1123-1124. 
25See id. at 223,507 A.2d at 1124 ("We have also reviewed the 
particular victim impact statement submitted in this case. Given 
the nature of the subject matter, it is a relatively straightforward 
and factual description of the effects of these murders on 
members of the Bronstein family.") (emphasis added). 
26See Booth v. Maryland, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). 
27Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (hereinafter 
Booth II) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) 
(plurality opinion». 
the defendant's "personal responsibility and moral 
guilt."28 "To do otherwise would create the risk that a 
death sentence will be based on considerations that are 
'constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to 
the sentencing process. "'29 
In concluding that victim impact evidence 
created an unacceptable risk that a death sentence 
would be imposed in an arbitrary manner, the Court 
reasoned that such evidence is "wholly unrelated to 
the blameworthiness of [the] particular defendant. "30 
Justice Powell further reasoned that the decision on 
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death 
may not "tum on the perception that the victim was a 
sterling member of the community rather than 
someone of questionable character."31 Thus, over the 
vigorous dissent of four justices,32 the Supreme 
Court's decision in Booth almost entirely barred the 
introduction of victim impact evidence to a sentencing 
jury in a capital proceeding.33 
Eleven days after Booth was decided, Justice 
Powell retired,34 and he was replaced by the relatively 
conservative Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.35 Accord-
ingly, when the Supreme Court's 1987-88 term began, 
28See id (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982». 
29See id (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983». 
30Id at 504. 
31ld at 506 (footnote omitted). 
32See id. at 515-519 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Justices 
O'Connor and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist); id at 519-521 
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justices White and O'Connor 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
33Cf id The Supreme Court's resolution of the case necessarily 
left open the question of the degree to which victim impact 
testimony would be admissible in non-capital cases. Also 
unresolved was the admissibility of such evidence when heard by 
ajudge, as opposed to a sentencingjury. 
34See Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering - A Personal 
Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 21, 33 (1992). 
35See, e.g., United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Wiley, 794 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Meyer, 802 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1986). But see, e.g., 
United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986); Vickers 
v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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five sitting justices were potentially inclined to 
overturn Booth.36 However, when initially confronted 
in 1989 with the opportunity to recognize the 
constitutionality of victim impact testimony in a 
capital sentencing proceeding, Justice White declined 
the invitation to overturn Booth.37 Ultimately, the 
issue returned to the Court in 1991, when the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to review Tennessee's 
imposition of a death sentence subsequent to the 
introduction of victim impact testimony. 38 
C. Payne v. Tennessee 
On June 27, 1987, Pervis Tyrone Payne passed 
the early morning and afternoon hours ingesting 
cocaine, beer, and malt liquor while awaiting the 
return of his girlfriend.39 Apparently agitated by his 
girlfriend's absence, and presumably impaired from 
his consumption of mind-altering substances, Payne 
entered the apartment of Charisse Christopher, who 
lived across the hall from Payne's girlfriend with her 
two year-old daughter Lacie and her three year-old son 
Nicholas.40 When Christopher resisted Payne's sexual 
advances, he turned violent.41 
Attacking Christopher with a butcher's knife, 
Payne inflicted 84 wounds with 41 separate thrusts 
which aggregately killed Christopher due to severe 
blood loss.42 Next to her mother's body on the kitchen 
floor, police found Lacie's corpse with stab wounds to 
the chest, abdomen, back, and head.43 Miraculously, 
even though he suffered multiple stab wounds which 
36See Berger, supra note 34, at 33-34. 
37See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) 
(White, J, concurring) ("Unless Booth v. Maryland is to be 
overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed.") (citation 
omitted); see also Berger, supra note 34, at 37-40 (discussing the 
Supreme Court's dismissal of "improvidently granted" certiorari 
in a Booth-related case, Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. 336 (1991 ». 
38See Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076 (1991). 
39See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 812 (1991). 
4°See id at 811-812. 
41See id at 812. 
42See id at 813. 
43See id. 
27.2 U. Bait. L. F.33 
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completely penetrated his body from front to back, 
Payne's third victim, Nicholas, survived the attack 
after seven hours of surgery. 44 Payne's criminal lark 
left the walls and floor of the Christopher apartment 
covered with blood.45 When the police found Payne 
exiting Christopher's apartment building, he looked as 
ifhe was "sweating blood."46 
Rejecting the defendant's testimony that another, 
unidentified assailant perpetrated the orgy of criminal-
ity in the Christopher apartment prior to Payne's 
innocent arrival at the scene, a jury convicted Payne 
on two counts of first-degree murder, and one count of 
assault with intent to murder in the first degree.47 At 
the bifurcated capital sentencing phase of the trial, 
four defense witnesses took the stand, pleading for the 
jury to spare Payne's life.48 In contrast, the state 
offered the impact testimony of Nicholas' grand-
mother: 
[Nicholas] cries for his mom. He doesn't 
seem to understand why she doesn't come 
home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He 
cries to me many times during the week 
and asks me, Grandmarnma, do you miss 
my Lacie? And I tell him yes. He says, 
I'm worried about my Lacie.49 
The prosecutor further emphasized this emotional 
testimony in rebuttal to Payne's closing argument: 
You [heard] what Nicholas Christopher will 
carry in his mind forever. When you talk 
about cruel, when you talk about atrocious, 
and when you talk about heinous, that 
picture will always come into your mind, 
probably throughout the rest of your lives. 
. .. [Petitioner's attorney] wants you to 
think about a good reputation . . .. He 
doesn't want you to think about the people 
44See id. 
4SSee id 
46See id at 812. 
47See id. at 813-814. 
48See id. at 814. 
491d at 814-815. 
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who love Charisse Christopher, her mother 
and daddy who loved her. The people who 
loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who 
are still here. The brother who mourns for 
her every single day .... 50 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the jury's 
sentence of death on each murder count.51 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari52 
to revisit the Court's former decisions in Booth and 
South Carolina v. Gathers which had held that victim 
impact evidence was precluded from consideration in 
a capital sentencing proceeding by the Eighth 
Amendment. 53 
With Justice White joining Justice Kennedy and 
the three remaining Booth dissenters, the Court 
reversed Booth and Gathers.54 Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Booth and Gathers 
were based upon the dual premises that only evidence 
relating to blameworthiness is relevant at a capital 
sentencing proceeding, and that victim impact evi-
dence does not reflect the offender's blame-
worthiness.55 Rehnquist rejected the latter premise: 
[T]he assessment of harm caused by the 
defendant as a result of the crime charged 
has understandably been an important 
concern of the criminal law . . . in 
determining the appropriate punishment. 
Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal 
defendants may be guilty of different 
offenses solely because their acts cause 
differing amounts of harm. 56 
SOld at 815-16. 
slSee State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990). 
S2See Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1076 (1991). 
S3See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991). 
S4See id at 830 n.2 (noting that the Payne holding did not address 
the admissibility of a "victim's family members' 
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, 
and the appropriate sentence"). 
sSSee id at 819. 
S6ld ("If a bank robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, 
and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun 
unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both 
The Payne majority observed that where a judge is 
given broad discretion in determining the appropriate 
sentence for a specific crime, the consideration of the 
harm caused by the crime is an essential factor in 
properly exercising that discretion. 57 Thus, the Court 
reasoned that allowing states to introduce victim 
impact evidence was constitutionally permissible to 
illustrate each victim's "uniqueness as an individual 
human being. "58 Invoking the long shadow cast by 
Williams v. New York, the Court concluded that victim 
impact evidence is a permissible method "of informing 
the sentencing authority about the specific harm 
caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general 
type long considered by sentencing authorities."59 
Implicitly concluding that the victim impact testimony 
presented by the State of Tennessee was not so unduly 
prejudicial so as to deprive Payne of a fair trial, the 
Supreme Court affirmed Payne's death sentence~O 
II. THE FOUR THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
As exemplified by biblical law and the Code ofHammurabi, early theories of sentencing 
focused upon retribution.61 Strictly retrospective in 
instances is identical, but his responsibility in the fonner is 
greater.") (quoting Booth II, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (l987)(Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
57See id at 821 ('''We think it desirable for the [sentencer] to 
have as much infonnation before it as possible when it makes the 
sentencing decision."') (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
204 (l976)(plurality)). 
58Id. at 823; see id. at 826 ("[T]h[is] testimony illustrated quite 
poignantly some of the hann that Payne's killing had caused; 
there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind 
that harm at the same time as it considers the mitigating evidence 
introduced by the defendant.") (emphasis added). 
59Id. at 825; see also id at 821 ("While the admission of this 
particular kind of evidence - designed to portray for the 
sentencing authority the actual harm caused by a particular crime 
- is of recent origin, this fact hardly renders it 
unconstitutional.") (citations omitted). 
60See id. at 825 ("[T]he evidence adduced in this case was 
illustrative of the harm caused by Payne's double murder."). 
61 See Susan Ann Comille, Note, Retribution's "Harm" 
Component and the Victim Impact Statement: Finding a 
Workable Model, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 389, 396 (1993). 
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application, retribution punishes an offender in 
relation to both the harm inflicted and the moral 
wrongfulness of the act.62 During the 1950s, the 
predominant goals of punishment in the American 
criminal justice system shifted from retribution and 
incapacitation63 to general deterrence64 and the 
rehabilitation of the offender.65 This trend was 
illustrated by California's indeterminate sentencing 
provisions, where the length of prison sentences for 
most crimes committed was left almost entirely to the 
discretion of penological authorities.66 As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has noted, however, "the pendulum 
has swung back."67 General disdain for the proposi-
tion that most criminals can be rehabilitated to any 
significant degree has once again shifted the focus of 
punishment to the core of retributive theory: the moral 
wrongfulness and the actual harm caused by the act. 68 
This second, or "actual harm" element of 
62See Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital 
Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. LJ. 107, 162-63 (1995-96). 
63See J.M. BURNS & J.S. MATTINA, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, 
AND CORRECTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 13 (Nicholas 
N. Kittrie & Elyce H. Zenoff, eds., Foundation Press 1981) ("A 
second great purpose of sentencing is that of separation of the 
criminal defendant from society. This end is sometimes referred 
to as incapacitation .... The separation rationale assumes that the 
conduct in these crimes is so serious and the chance of repetition 
so great that the judge, acting for society, must conclude that 
protection of the public is the primary objective."). 
64See id. at 12-13 ("[G]eneral deterrence ... rests on the notion 
that by the sentence imposed on an individual defendant, and by 
communication of that sentence to others who might commit 
similar crimes, the latter will forego their projected criminal 
behavior out of fear they will suffer the same or similar 
sentence.")(internal quotations omitted); see Grossman, supra 
note 62, at 164. 
65See Comille, supra note 61, at 396-97 ("The rehabilitative 
model is founded upon the premise that a criminal can be cured 
of his tendency to commit crime through treatment. Since the 
focus is upon the criminal defendant, concern for the victim 
becomes secondary.") (footnotes omitted). 
66See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820 (1991). 
67Id. 
68See Comille, supra note 61, at 397; see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 
819-821. 
27.2 U. Bait. L. F. 35 
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retribution has emerged as the principle theory69 
justifying the introduction of victim impact testimony 
immediately prior to sentencing: "Victim impact 
evidence is simply another form or method of 
informing the sentencing authority about the specific 
harm caused by the crime in question."70 Such 
testimony offers a glimpse of the life upon which the 
defendant chose to inflict harm, and also demonstrates 
the injury to the victim, the victim's family, and to 
society.71 This testimony is therefore relevant to the 
sentencing determination because it indicates the full 
extent of the emotional and psychological harm caused 
by the offender's act. 72 Thus, the argument proceeds, 
full consideration of the level of harm caused by the 
defendant's crime is necessary to fashion a 
proportional sentence which inflicts a punishment 
reflecting what the offender justly deserves.73 
Initially appealing, the retributionist justification 
for the introduction of victim impact testimony fails 
under stricter scrutiny. Retribution is based upon 
principles of equality which demand that the offender 
recelve punishment commensurate with the 
sentencer's objective determinations of moral 
blameworthiness and the harm caused by the criminal 
acts.74 By contrast, inherently subjective victim 
6~either incapacitation nor general deterrence has been 
advanced to justify the introduction of victim impact testimony. 
If it is true that such testimony might aid in the rehabilitation of 
the offender, then it follows such testimony would assist 
rehabilitation when presented in any forum besides the inherently 
prejudicial atmosphere of a sentencing proceeding. See Long, 
supra note 4, at 213. 
70Payne, 501 U.S. at 825; see Comille, supra note 61, at 401 ("In 
the context of retribution, victim impact statements are relevant 
because they provide the sentencer with an assessment of the 
harm component. A retributivist needs to consider harm along 
with blameworthiness in order to calculate an appropriate 
sentence.") (footnotes omitted). 
71See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 
U.S. 367,397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting». 
72See Comille, supra note 61, at 416. 
73See id; Grossman, supra note 62, at 162-63. 
7·See BURNS & MATTINA, supra note 63, at 39-40 (quoting 
IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGRUNDE DER 
REICHTSLEHRE (T. & T. Clark 1887». 
27.2 U. BaIt. L. F. 36 
impact testimony is not competent to offer an 
objective determination of the actual harm caused by 
a criminal act for two reasons.75 First, crime victims 
react in a plethora of ways, and any individual's 
reaction to a single criminal act will be a subjective 
response to those unique circumstances.76 Second, no 
process has been persuasively advanced which allows 
for the accurate and objective assessment of victim 
harm to be comprehensively applied in a practical 
fashion throughout the entire criminal justice system.77 
Any sentencer is thus compelled to apply victim 
impact testimony in an arbitrary, emotional, and 
subjective fashion. 
The use of victim impact testimony is more 
appropriately analyzed in terms of personal revenge 
rather than retribution.78 Retribution is a rationally 
proportioned punishment fixed by society through its 
elected representatives; conversely, personal revenge 
is arbitrarily inflicted by the victim and knows no 
principled limitations.79 Information offered by a 
grieving victim or third party encourages the sentencer 
to sympathize with these individuals, and to accord 
weight to information offered solely for the purpose of 
imposing a harsher penalty to the offender.80 This 
deference to personal vengeance is not an acceptable 
justification for punishment.81 
Victim impact testimony thus impermissibly 
invites the sentencer to extract punishment beyond the 
75See Fahey, supra note I, at 256 ("It is difficult to see how this 
standard can be met with the use of information which is 
inherently subjective.") (emphasis added). 
76See Long, supra note 4, at 217. 
77See Comille, supra note 61, at 414. 
78See Bartolo, supra note 7, at 1243 ("[I]ndividual vengeance is 
not accepted as a justification for punishment."); see also Fahey, 
supra note I, at 261 ("The evidence encourages sentencers to 
sympathize with not only the victim, but also the survivors."). 
79See Fahey, supra note I, at 262. 
80See id But see Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal 
Court: The Need/or Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 233, 244 
(1991) (observing evidence of victims' desire to extract personal 
vengeance is inconclusive). 
81See Bartolo, supra note 7, at 1243. 
reasonably foreseeable effects of a specific crime.82 
The touchstone of our criminal justice system is a 
criminal code representing measured, communal 
blame as articulated by the legislature.83 Fundamental 
notions of justice therefore demand that the offender 
should be punished only for the results of reasonably 
foreseeable acts which have been proscribed as 
criminal by the legislature, rather than attenuated, 
unforeseeable emotional harm to the victim or to third 
parties.84 In other words, the only harm to the victim 
which may justify enhanced punishment is the harm 
which "is both foreseeable to the defendant and clearly 
identified in advance of the crime by the legislature as 
class a/harm that should in every case result in more 
severe punishment."8s Bentham hypothesized that if 
crimes of unequal gravity were punished equally, then 
"the public would lose the important ability to 
distinguish serious wrongs from more trivial ones."86 
A fair extension of this corollary is that equal crimes 
should not be punished unequally based upon 
fortuitous, unforseen circumstances.87 To legitimately 
reflect retributionist theory, differences in punishment 
must reflect objectively identifiable differences in 
either moral blameworthiness or in reasonably 
foreseeable actual harm as clearly articulated by the 
legislature in proscribing criminal conduct.88 To the 
contrary, victim impact testimony encourages punish-
ment based upon arbitrary, post hoc appraisals of 
personal vengeance rather than established standards 
of communal blame.89 "The victim's opinion is 
82 See Fahey, supra note 1, at 241. 
83See Hall, supra note 80, at 260. 
84Cf id. at 261 ("Another concern ... is the issue of whether 
victim participation statutes are logically or practically consistent 
with structured or guided sentencing procedures. "). 
85See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 863 (1991) (Stevens, 1., 
dissenting) (emphasis added); see Fahey, supra note 1,239-41. 
86Grossman, supra note 62, at 167. 
87See Booth II, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987)(noting that such 
arbitrariness relies upon considerations '''constitutionally 
impennissible [and] totally irrelevant to the sentencing process"') 
(quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983». 
88See Hall, supra note 80, at 260. 
891d. at 261. 
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irrelevant to any legitimate sentencing factor .... "90 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
The basic tenet of faith upon which our predecessors founded the United States of 
America was the stated premise that "all men are 
created equal."9J As Justice Marshall observed, the 
historical record adequately signifies that our 
forefathers did not feel compelled to practice in fact 
this belief they so eloquently stated in theory. 92 As the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution demonstrates, however, the principles of 
Equal Protection guaranteed by that amendment are 
evolutionary in nature.93 Thus, our judicial system 
should no more be limited by recently propounded 
interpretations of Equal Protection that do not 
vindicate the Fourteenth Amendment than it was wed 
to illegitimate, archaic dogma bearing the imprimatur 
of racism.94 
It is gospel to our Equal Protection jurisprudence 
that the State may not arbitrarily select one individual, 
or class of individuals, and inflict upon them a penalty 
which is not imposed upon others equally guilty of the 
90See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 429. 
91THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
92See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial a/the 
United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1,2-5 (1987). 
93See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.; see also Marshall, supra note 
92, at 2-5. 
94Cf Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 
(1954) ("Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. 
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs ... are ... deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.") (citation omitted); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption that the 
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with 
a badge of inferiority .... We cannot accept this proposition."); 
id. at 555 (Harlan, John Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[S]uch 
legislation, as that here in question, is inconsistent not only with 
the equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and 
State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within 
the United States."). 
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same offense.95 This prohibition extends with equal 
force to laws which, though fair and impartial on their 
face, are administered in a discriminatory fashion. 96 
The Equal Protection Clause also requires the 
State to extend identical protection against criminal 
conduct to every individual's life and liberty.97 Thus, 
"the protection given by the laws of the States shall be 
equal in respect to life and liberty ... no matter how 
poor, no matter how friendless, no matter how 
ignorant" the person.98 America's original Fourteenth 
Amendment principles therefore bar treating similarly 
situated victims of crime differently based upon a 
victim's subjective characteristics. 
As Booth acknowledged, the consequence of 
allowing the introduction of victim impact evidence is 
the inescapable practical effect that offenders will 
receive harsher punishment for committing criminal 
acts against victims deemed by society to be more 
worthy ofprotection.99 Introduction of victim impact 
testimony compels the inescapable inference that 
courts can and should assess a defendant's wrong 
according to the relative weight of the victim's 
societal merits.loo "Since every victim is unique, the 
presentation of this information can 'only be intended 
to identify some victims as more worthy of protection 
than others. "'101 
Concededly, current Equal Protection analysis 
does not lend itself to successfully assailing victim 
9SSee Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 
153-61 (1897) ("[A]lways [presuming good faith on the part of 
a legislature] is to make the protecting clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment a mere rope of sand.") (emphasis added). 
96See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). 
97See Berger, supra note 34, at 47 n.130; Jacobus tenBroek, 
Equal Under Law 230-31 (Collier 1951). 
98CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1865) 
(Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, recognized as the 
author of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally. 
tenBroek, supra note 97, at 320. 
99See Booth II, 482 U.S. 496, 506 n.8 (1987); Fahey, supra note 
1, at 243-44. 
lOoSee Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 28 (Alaska 1977) 
(Boochever, C.]., dissenting). 
IOISee Fahey, supra note I, at 244 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 
866 (Stevens, J., dissenting». 
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impact evidence on that ground. Defendants unfairly 
prejudiced by the introduction of such testimony are 
neither members of a suspect classification,102 nor is 
equal treatment for crimes against similarly situated 
victims one of the few fundamental rights recognized 
within the Equal Protection framework. l03 This 
practical reality, however, does not conceal the 
conspicuous fact that the determination of criminal 
sanctions based upon the subjective traits of the victim 
has been given actual "backdoor" effect via victim 
impact evidence.104 Although the law does not allow 
the sentencer to weigh relative characteristics of the 
victim in apportioning an appropriate punishment, 105 
victim impact evidence effectively sanctions this 
methodology. In doing so, victim impact testimony 
repudiates the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that "all men are equal in the rights of life 
and liberty before the majesty of American law."106 
IV. DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
A. Introduction 
In contrast to Equal Protection, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides fertile 
ground on which to attack unfairly prejudicial victim 
impact testimony. 107 In Williams v. New York, the 
Supreme Court established the modem principle that 
the Constitution does not bar ajudge from considering 
all relevant evidence in fashioning an appropriate 
criminal sentence. 108 
A generation later, however, the Court narrowed 
I02See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 V.S. 
432 (1985). 
103See Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
I04See Fahey, supra note I, at 247 ("If such a facial classification 
of victim consideration would be invalid, how could the 
[Supreme] Court ever permit the same comparisons to be made 
implicitly through the use of victim impact evidence?"). 
IOSState v. Cadwallader, 434 N. W.2d 506, 509-10 (Neb. 1989). 
I06CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1865). 
107See Payne v. Tennessee, 50 I V.S. 808, 836 (1991 )(Souter, J., 
concurring). 
108See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). 
this doctrine by declaring "it is now clear that the 
sentencing process ... must satisfy the requirements 
of the Due Process Clause."I09 A defendant therefore 
has a constitutional interest in the integrity of the 
sentencing procedure, even though that defendant may 
have no right to object to the particular sentence 
actually imposed. I 10 
Thus, the threshold inquiry is "what process is 
due?"11I "To comply with due process . . . the 
sentencing court must assure itself that the information 
upon which it bases the sentence is reliable and 
accurate. "112 Consequently, inflammatory victim im-
pact testimony which causes the sentencer to act upon 
passion and emotion, rather than reason and 
deliberation, so infects the sentencing proceeding with 
unfair prejudice as to render the result a denial of due 
process. I 13 
B. Cianos v. State 
In apparent harmony with this constitutional 
mandate, section 780 of Article 27 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland provides that at the request of the 
State's Attorney, and within the sound discretion of 
the trial court, a victim may address the "sentencing 
judge or jury under oath or affirmation before the 
imposition of a sentence. "114 Reflecting the recent 
trend that "a victim of crime has a constitutional right 
to be treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity 
during all phases of the criminal justice process,"IIS on 
November 8, 1994, the voters of the State of Maryland 
approved Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, which provides, inter alia, that "a victim of 
crime shall have the right . . . upon request and if 
I09Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality). 
II°See id; see also State v. Conn, 669 P.2d 581, 583 (Ariz. 1983). 
II I Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). 
I12People v. Outley, 610 N.E.2d 356, 360 (N.Y. 1993). 
I13Payne, 501 U.S. at 836 (Souter, 1., concurring). 
114MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 780 (1996). Unless otherwise 
specified, all subsequent statutory references are to MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27 (1996). 
liS 1994 Md. Laws 102, at 1195-96. 
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practicable . .. to be heard at a criminal proceeding, 
as these rights ... are specified by law."116 
In reviewing the sentence imposed upon Sean 
Patrick Hall after his conviction for two counts of 
automobile manslaughter, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland recently clarified the allocution rights of 
victims at a sentencing proceeding. JI7 The Court of 
Appeals held that the representatives of Hall's victims 
were precluded from challenging a final criminal 
judgment, even though they had been denied the 
opportunity to verbally address the court prior to the 
imposition of Hall's sentence. 118 The Court of 
Appeals, however, was not content to merely dispose 
of the case at hand. In considered though extensive 
dicta, Maryland's court of last resort proceeded to 
opme: 
The mandate of the people is clear. In 
response to that mandate, trial judges must 
give appropriate consideration to the 
impact of crime upon the victims. An 
important step towards accomplishing that 
task is to accept victim impact testimony 
wherever possible. Therefore, ordinarily a 
request by the sentencing judge to the 
victims that they waive their right to 
address the court as to the impact of the 
crimes upon them should not be made . .. 
. [P]etitioners were arguably denied their 
rights guaranteed by Md. Code § 
[780](a).119 
The implication of this language is clear: The Court of 
Appeals has dismissed the discretionary language of 
Article 47 and section 780, and in its place has 
mandated an almost irrebuttable presumption that 
victims, or their representatives, shall have the right to 
116Maryland Declaration of Rights, art. 47 (emphasis added). 
117See Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 659 A.2d 291 (1995). 
118See id at 411, 659 A.2d at 293-94 ("An appeal by a victim is 
collateral to and may not interrupt a criminal case, and such an 
appeal cannot result in a reversal of the judgment and a 
reopening of the case."). 
119Id at 413, 659 A.2d at 295 (emphasis partially added) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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testify prior to the imposition of a criminal sentence.120 
c. Victim Impact Testimony's Sole Purpose 
Fundamental notions of fairness require that the 
imposition of a criminal sentence be a reasoned 
response to both the harmful effects of the crime and 
the moral blameworthiness of the criminal. I21 As the 
Supreme Court has cogently recognized: 
It is no doubt constitutionally permissible, 
if not constitutionally required, for the 
State to insist that the individualized 
assessment of the appropriateness of the .. 
. penalty [be] a moral inquiry into the 
culpability of the defendant, and not an 
emotional response to the . .. evidence. 122 
In other words, irrelevant information or inflammatory 
rhetoric that diverts the sentencer's attention or invites 
an irrational, purely subjective response is repugnant 
to the elemental notions of fairness guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 123 
The inherently cathartic testimony of victims, or their 
representatives, requires a sentencer's focus to shift to 
subject matter not bearing upon the defendant's 
culpability or the circumstances of the offense: "The 
passion and prejudice that results from this type of 
testimony does not require explanation."124 
Victim impact evidence has generally been 
characterized within one of three broad categories. 125 
The first broad category concerns testimony about the 
I20See Dix v. County of Shasta, 963 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 
1992) (Kozinski, J.) (by analogy, setting forth a two-prong test 
for individual State establishment of a federally enforceable 
procedural due process right for victims to testify at State 
criminal proceedings). 
I2ISee infra Part II. 
122Saflle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1990) (emphasis added) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
123People v. Raley, 830 P.2d 712,742 (Cal. 1992). 
124Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 781, 490 A.2d 1228, 1274 
(1985) (Cole, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). 
12SSee Hall, supra note 80, at 255-56. 
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direct harm to the victim flowing from the 
circumstances of the crime. 126 Second, victim 
testimony may indicate the psychological or 
physiological impact upon the victim, or upon the 
victim's family and friends, that results from the 
offender's act. 127 Third, in some cases, the sentencer 
is allowed to hear a victim's opinion as to the 
character of the offender, or as to the sentence which 
should ultimately be imposed.1 28 As will be shown, 
none of these categories contributes to an objective 
sentence based upon either the offender's moral 
blameworthiness or the harm caused by the crime. 
The first broad category of victim impact 
testimony portrays to the sentencing authority the 
subjective harm caused by a specific crime. 129 This 
category of testimony suffers from a number of 
defects. Foremost is the clear implication that the 
offender receives a windfall at sentencing when the 
harm to the victim is less than the offender intended. 130 
Moreover, as the inquiry moves farther away from the 
verifiable, objective consequences of the criminal act, 
a sentence imposed by considering "a quick glimpse 
of the life" of the victim is more likely to be based 
upon the arbitrary, subjective characteristics of the 
victim and the subjective, emotional response of the 
sentencer. 13 I 
The second broad category of impact testimony 
relates to the psychological or physiological effects 
upon the victim, or the victim's family and friends.132 
Within this class of testimony, the Supreme Court of 
Idaho has allowed the introduction of the statement: "I 
126See Comille, supra note 61, at 394-95. 
127See Hall, supra note 80, at 256. 
12BSee Comille, supra note 61, at 395. 
129See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991). 
IJOSee Hall, supra note 80, at 255. 
1J1See id. at 255-56; Payne, 501 U.S. at 822. 
132e! Payne, 501 U.S. at 826 ("It is an affront to the civilized 
members of the human race to say that at sentencing in a capital 
case, a parade of witnesses may praise the background, character 
and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in this case), without 
limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears 
upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.") 
(quoting Payne, 791 S.W.2dat 19). 
think someone could probably have cut off my right 
arm, and I would not have missed it as much as I have 
my daughter."133 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has allowed a daughter's statement, "who is 
going to be my daddy now that my daddy is gone" and 
testimony that a father "often has chest pains as if a 
bullet pierces through his right lung - where [the 
victim] was hit at close range with a gun ShOt."134 It is 
difficult to fathom how such inflammatory testimony 
objectively demonstrates "the loss to the victim's 
family and to society."J35 
The third genre of impact testimony allows the 
victim or the victim's representatives to offer opinion 
as to the offender's character, or as to an appropriate 
sentence. 136 Ignoring the admonition that such 
testimony is merely a biased opinion from someone 
having "a great personal interest in the outcome,"137 a 
victim's mother has been allowed to testify: "I feel 
that the death penalty is a fair penalty, and I believe 
that under the law it should be administered in a case 
such as this."138 Not to be outdone, Maryland's 
highest court has not only sanctioned the observation, 
"personally, I feel, if you kill anyone, you should be 
put to death," but the Court of Appeals has also 
endorsed the general theories of incapacitation and 
deterrence introduced by a victim's wife at the 
offender's sentencing: "[I]f[appellant is] put to death, 
he won't kill another policeman, and ... other people 
[will] know you can't get away with it, get out in 
133State v. Fain, 809 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Idaho 1991). 
'34Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 767, 490 A.2d at 1228, 1268 
(Cole, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
475 U.S. 1078 (1986). 
135Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991). 
136See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. While victims' family 
members' opinion testimony regarding the crime, the defendant, 
and the appropriate sentence was rejected by the Booth 11 
majority as unconstitutional, Payne expressly refused to pass 
upon the constitutionality of such testimony. See id. 
I37State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ohio 1990); see State 
v. Carlson, 406 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Neb. 1987)("[A] judge must 
not and cannot allow the judgments and conclusions of the victim 
to be substituted for those of the court in imposing sentence. To 
do so constitutes an abuse of discretion.") 
138Fain, 809 P.2d at 1152. 
Articles 
twenty years and walk the streets."139 Such testimony 
represents the thinly veiled primordial scream for 
personal vengeance rather than the objective 
"individualized consideration"140 of a "standard for 
determining the severity of the sentence that will be 
meted OUt."141 
D. Effect Upon The Sentencer 
In addressing the effects of impact testimony 
upon the sentencer, some courts have drawn a 
distinction between evidence offered to a jury, and 
evidence offered to a judge. 142 Other courts have more 
realistically acknowledged that even where the victim 
impact testimony is presented only to a judge, such 
evidence may be "simply too powerful for a human 
sentencer to ignore."143 Thus, in many circumstances, 
ajudge may be affected as much as a jury by intensely 
potent impact testimony, even though normally 
accustomed to mentally excluding impermissible 
evidence. 144 As Judge Weinstein has recognized: 
An impractical rule of total suppression 
would almost invite self-deception by a 
judge forced to deny that he had considered 
a factor that was strongly influencing his 
subconscious reactions. The judge's 
capacity to ignore such information is 
probably better than a juror's, but it is 
limited. 145 
1 39Lodowski, 302 Md. at 782, 490 A.2d at 1275 (Cole, J., 
concurring). 
140Payne, 501 U.S. at 822; see also Berger, supra note 34, at 
28-29. 
14lPayne, 501 U.S. at 820 (quoting S. Wheeler, et aI., SITTING IN 
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 
(1988}). 
'
42Randell v. State, 846 P.2d 278, 280 (Nev. 1993); People v. 
Johnson, 594 N.E.2d 253, 270 (Ill. 1992); State v. Keith, 754 
P.2d 474, 488 (Mont. 1988). 
143 See People v. Simms, 520 N .E.2d 308, 314 (Ill. 1988). 
I44See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 416; cf Hall, supra note 80, 
at 246 ("[T]here is disagreement as to the extent to which the 
statements actually influence judges' decisions."). 
'45United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253,260 (E.D.N.Y. 
I 970) (emphasis added); see Post v. Ohio, 484 U.S. 1079, 1082 
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Certainly a judge is not entitled to more latitude than 
a jury in imposing an arbitrary or capricious 
sentence. 146 "[T]he presumption that judges know and 
apply the rules of evidence should not be converted 
into license to conclude that judges are inhuman, 
incapable of being moved by passion as well as 
reason."147 
Thus, the appropriate standard under a due 
process analysis is determining the point at which the 
sentencer's emotional outrage to the introduction of 
victim impact testimony prevents that sentencer "from 
imposing a properly individualized sentence."148 It is 
difficult to reconcile a rape victim's statement, "[a]fter 
all, your daughter may be next," with the premise that 
a sentencing judge will always, or even frequently, be 
able to disregard such visceral testimony.149 "[T]here 
is no reason to denigrate th[is] danger simply because 
the recipients of the evidence wore judicial robes."15o 
E. Non-Capital Cases 
Just as it contravenes human experience to 
presume victim impact evidence will not unfairly 
prejudice a sentencing judge, similarly, no logical 
reason exists to distinguish between the use of such 
evidence in capital versus non-capital sentencing 
proceedings. 151 While "death is different" under 
Eighth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has 
drawn no such distinction when applying the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 152 
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It would be unrealistic and 
unwise to presume that no judge could be moved, in both heart 
and deed, by the anguish and rage expressed by a murder 
victim's family."). 
146See State v. Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299, 320 (Idaho 1989). 
147post v. Ohio, 484 U.S. at 1082 (Marshall, 1., dissenting). 
148State v. Brand, 506 So. 2d 702, 706 (La. App. 1987). 
149State v. Yanez, 469 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Minn. App. 1991). 
ISOpost v. Ohio, 484 U.S. at 1082 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
ISISee Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 419. 
IS2Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use 
of Extraneous and Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases 
of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1249, 1259-60 (1993); see 
State v. Skaff, 447 N.W.2d 84,87 (Wis. App. 1989) ("Although 
27.2 U. BaIt. L. F. 42 
To the contrary, relevant constitutional precedent 
unambiguously suggests that a non-capital "sentencing 
process ... must satisfy the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause.",s3 The fairness guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause therefore requires that in every 
case the unfair prejudice of victim impact testimony 
be weighed against the probative value of that 
evidence. ,s4 
F. Relevance 
Regardless of society's desire to give the victim 
of crime a greater role in America's criminal justice 
system, victim impact testimony simply has no 
legitimate role in a sentencing proceeding. ISS Such 
testimony distracts the sentencer from the 
constitutionally mandated focus upon the offender. ,s6 
Additionally, such testimony substantially increases 
the risk that the subsequent sentence will be imposed 
in an arbitrary and capricious basis.,s7 
Gardner was a death penalty case, we perceive no reason why its 
rationale should not be applied to penalties of lesser 
severity.")(citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977»; id. 
at 87 n.7 (noting that in deciding Gardner, "Justice Stevens 
relied on non-capital cases, such as Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 
128 (1967)."). 
IS3Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). While 
concededly Gardner was a capital case, the Supreme Court 
expressly proffered a due process justification in addition to this 
factor: "[T]here have been two constitutional developments 
which require us to scrutinize a State's capital-sentencing 
procedures more closely than was necessary in 1949. First, five 
Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death 
is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be 
imposed in this country .... Second, it is now clear that the 
sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.") (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). 
IS4See Hall, supra note 80, at 255 ("[T]o the extent that these 
concerns are based upon due process considerations, the capital 
versus non-capital dichotomy collapses."). 
ISSSee Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 767, 490 A.2d 1228, 
1267 (1985)(Cole, 1., dissenting), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). 
IS6See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 398. 
IS7See Randell Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of 
Victim Impact Evidence During the Sentencing Phase of Capital 
The Supreme Court has mandated that a criminal 
sentence must be "directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender."158 Indirect injury 
to the victim, or the bereavement of the victim's 
family, may not properly be relied upon to aggravate 
an offender's sentence because these factors bear "no 
rational relationship to [any] degree of culpability."159 
Thus, the sympathy and prejudice aroused by victim 
impact testimony undercut the constitutional 
imperative that a sentence must be a "reasoned moral 
response" to the offender and the crime.160 
Similarly, by its nature, victim impact testimony 
demands a purely arbitrary calculus in response to its 
introduction. 161 The clear implication in receiving 
such testimony is that an offender's culpability will 
turn not on the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of the offender's own criminal conduct; but rather 
upon fortuitous factors, such as the composition of the 
victim's family:162 
I cannot comprehend how the victim's 
social and charitable activities and the 
extent of the parents' grief can be con-
sidered as part of 'the offense and the 
circumstances surrounding it' and therefore 
pertinent to sentencing. 163 
While invoking sympathy, such evidence does not 
guide the sentencer's discretion in a permissible 
manner. To the contrary, victim impact testimony 
impermissibly invites increased punishment based, not 
upon the crime or the criminal, but upon the 
fortuitous, subjective characteristics of the victim. 164 
Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 589, 624 (1992). 
ls8Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). 
ls9Peopie v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287 (Cal. App. 1984). 
160See Fahey, supra note 1, at 252 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 
U.S. 484, 493 (1990». 
161See Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
162See Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 287. 
163Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 27 (Alaska 1977)(Boochever, 
C.J., dissenting). 
164Lodowski, 302 Md. at 765-66, 490 A.2d at 1266 (Cole, J., 
concurring). 
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A criminal sentence should be fashioned "to the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the crime and the 
individual then being sentenced. "165 Victim impact 
testimony relates to neither of these factors and is 
therefore irrelevant in a sentencing proceeding.166 
G. Inherent Flaws 
Victim impact testimony additionally suffers 
from several inherently prejudicial flaws which 
counsel against its introduction during a sentencing 
proceeding. 167 Studies which suggest uneven and 
minimal participation of victims, or their repre-
sentatives, at sentencing proceedings support the 
premise that victim impact testimony which 
contributes to aggravating a sentence in anyone case 
is the functional equivalent of "lightning striking" that 
particular offender. 168 
The impossibility of formulating discernible, 
judicial standards at the appellate level to determine if 
a trial court has been unfairly prejudiced by impact 
testimony is a second inherent flaw in allowing victim 
16SId at 773,490 A.2d at 1270 (quoting Henry v. State, 273 Md. 
131, 150, 328 A.2d 293, 304 (1974». 
166See Robison, 829 F.2d at 1505 ("[T]he lesson taught in Booth 
is equally applicable here because the underlying reasoning for 
limiting the scope of evidence allows for no distinction between 
misdirected evidence offered by either party"); Lodowski, 302 
Md. at 774, 490 A.2d at 1270 (Cole, 1., concurring) ("Manifestly, 
the survivors of the murder victims cannot relate any relevant 
facts concerning the circumstances of the murders because the 
survivors were not present at the time of the crime."); cf Gathers, 
490 U.S. 805, 811 ("Notwithstanding that the papers had been 
admitted into evidence for another purpose, their content cannot 
be said to relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.") 
(emphasis added). 
167See Robison, 829 F.2d at 1503-05 (questioning whether a 
victim's representative's views against administering the death 
penalty must be admitted); Coyne, supra note 157, at 627-28 
(questioning whether defense counsel is required to impugn the 
character of a victim); Berger, supra note 34, at 54-57 
(questioning whether racial or other biases are augmented by the 
introduction of such testimony). 
168See Hall, supra note 80, at 241-43 (citing a study that victims 
or victim representatives made an oral statement in less than ten 
percent of the cases); Berger, supra note 34, at 48. 
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testimony.169 "Unlike a verdict of guilt or innocence, 
sentencing decisions involve subjective factors."17o 
Another fatal flaw which accompanies victim 
impact evidence is the mere appearance of unfair 
prejudice which accompanies the introduction of such 
testimony. 171 As Justice Marshall noted, "victim 
impact evidence [is] inadmissable because it create [ s] 
a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the sentencer 
would impose the . . . penalty in an arbitrary 
manner."172 Hence, due process guarantees are 
implicated not only at the point where unfair prejudice 
can be proven, but rather at the mere introduction of 
such evidence.173 
H. The Darden Standard 
Where no specific constitutional right has been 
abridged, the general standard to determine if 
improperly admitted evidence violates the Due 
Process Clause is whether the violation "so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resul[t] ... a 
denial of due process."174 In the context of victim 
impact evidence, the appropriate constitutional inquiry 
is whether victim testimony risks a sentence "based on 
passion, not deliberation."175 In other words, does 
169See Hellerstein, supra note 12, at 420 ("The Maryland Court 
of Appeals found the V.I.S. to be 'relatively straightforward and 
factual.' Yet the Supreme Court found the same V.I.S. to be 
'emotionally charged and prejudicial.' If the same V.I.S. can be 
viewed in two ways by two courts, it will be difficult to achieve 
a uniform standard distinguishing between victim evidence that 
is forbidden, and victim evidence that is admissible.") (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
17°People v. Simms, 520 N.E.2d 308, 315 (1988). 
I7ISee Post v. Ohio, 484 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1988)(Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
172/d. (internal citations omitted). 
17l/d. 
174Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974». 
17SPayne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (l991)(Souter, J., 
concurring) ("Evidence about the victims and survivors, and any 
jury argument predicated on it, can of course be so inflammatory 
as to risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not 
deliberation."). 
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such testimony threaten to inflame the passions of the 
sentencer "more than did the facts of the crime?"176 
The Fourteenth Amendment thus requires the trial 
judge to balance these factors in each particular case 
to ensure the introduction of victim impact testimony 
does not violate the defendant's due process rights. 177 
The dicta of the Ganos majority is repugnant to 
this constitutional requirement of individualized 
assessment. 178 Supreme Court precedent clearly in-
dicates that the Due Process Clause "include [ s] certain 
evidentiary principles which override state rules with 
which they conflict."179 Thus, the probative value of 
evidence introduced by the State is an issue of 
constitutional magnitude. 180 
The rule of Ganos scorns any assessment of the 
probative value of specific victim impact evidence. 
Indeed, any such balancing of "probative value" 
against "unfair prejudice" would leave little such 
testimony admissible, because the narrow probative 
value of such evidence l81 pales in relation to the 
tendency of such testimony to suggest imposing a 
sentence on an improper, emotional basis. 182 Since the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland has dictated that a trial 
court ordinarily shall make no individualized 
assessment of any improper effects of victim 
testimony upon the sentencer's emotions or biases, 
1761d. at 832 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
1771d. at 836 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[I]n each case there is a 
traditional guard against the inflammatory risk, in the trial 
judge's authority and responsibility to control the proceedings 
consistently with due process . ... ") (emphasis added). 
178See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
179Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and 
Argument After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 
1040 (l993) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Green v. Georgia, 
442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam». 
18°See id. 
181See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text; see also Levy, 
supra note 179, at 1044-45. 
182See Levy, supra note 179, at 1046; see also Smith, supra note 
152, at 1293 ("[A]ccording to Black's Law Dictionary, 'unfair 
prejudice,' means 'undue tendency to suggest decision on 
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily an emotional 
one. "'). 
such testimony may frequently taint the trial so as to 
make the resulting sentence a denial of due process. 183 
"Evidence that has the effect of arousing the passion 
and prejudice of the sentencer does not satisfy this 
constitutional standard."I84 
V. ALTERNATIVE AVENUES 
A s the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized, limiting the 
admissibility of evidence lacking probative value 
"allows for no distinction between misdirected 
evidence offered by either party."185 Hence, the Due 
Process Clause requires that if society wishes to 
involve victims in the criminal justice process, society 
must choose alternative fora besides the inherently 
inflammatory arena of a sentencing hearing. 186 Cited 
examples of such alternatives include the prevention 
of crime through neighborhood watch programs or 
citizens' police academies. 187 Most significant, 
however, is the practical reality that victims are 
represented at the sentencing proceeding through their 
elected lawmakers, through prosecutors elected by the 
community, and through the judges appointed by, and 
the police hired by, popularly elected executive 
officials. 188 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Victim impact testimony impermissibly allows a sentencing authority to impose a 
punishment based neither upon the offender's moral 
blameworthiness nor the direct circumstances of the 
crime. 189 As Justice Stevens recognized in his Payne 
\83See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). 
184Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 765, 490 A.2d 1228, 1266 
(1985)(Cole, J., concurring), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). 
18sRobison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (lOth Cir. 1987). 
186See Berger, supra note 34, at 65. 
187See Long, supra note 4, at 226. 
188See id. at 219-21. 
189See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text. 
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dissent, such evidence of victim impact may "have 
strong political appeal but no proper place in a 
reasoned judicial opinion."19o It is a fundamental 
premise of American jurisprudence that if a legislature 
wishes to impose a penalty graduated to a particular 
harm, then the legislature should classify that harm. 191 
To the contrary, victim impact evidence graduates 
punishment based upon fortuitous, arbitrary, and 
inflammatory considerations: 
There is a world of difference between 
presenting the basic facts necessary for the 
judge to be informed adequately of the 
circumstances surrounding the offense and 
including an emotion-laden narrative 
pertaining to the victim. 192 
Since, under Maryland law, the trial court is not 
required, nor even arguably allowed, to balance the 
unfair prejUdice of victim impact testimony against its 
relatively low probative value, such testimony when 
offered will frequently contaminate the sentencing 
proceeding with such unfairness as to result in a denial 
of due process.193 
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